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Background: Destruction of health systems in fragile and conflict-affected states increases civilian mortality.
Despite the size, scope, scale and political influence of international security forces intervening in fragile states,
little attention has been paid to array of ways they may impact health systems beyond their effects on short-term
humanitarian health aid delivery.
Methods: Using case studies we published on international security forces’ impacts on health systems in Haiti,
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, we conducted a comparative analysis that examined three questions: What
aspects, or building blocks, of health systems did security forces impact across the cases and what was the nature
of these impacts? What forums or mechanisms did international security forces use to interact with health system
actors? What policies facilitated or hindered security forces from supporting health systems?
Results: We found international security forces impacted health system governance, information systems and
indigenous health delivery organizations. Positive impacts included bolstering the authority, transparency and
capability of health system leadership. Negative impacts included undermining the impartial nature of indigenous
health institutions by using health projects to achieve security objectives. Interactions between security and health
actors were primarily ad hoc, often to the detriment of health system support efforts. When international security
forces were engaged in health system support activities, the most helpful communication and consultative
mechanisms to manage their involvement were ones that could address a wide array of problems, were nimble
enough to accommodate rapidly changing circumstances, leveraged the power of personal relationships, and
were able to address the tensions that arose between security and health system supporting strategies. Policy
barriers to international security organizations participating in health system support included lack of mandate,
conflicts between security strategies and health system preservation, and lack of interoperability between security
and indigenous health organizations with respect to logistics and sharing information.
Conclusions: The cases demonstrate both the opportunities and risks of international security organizations
involvement in health sector protection, recovery and reconstruction. We discuss two potential approaches to
engaging these organizations in health system support that may increase the chances of realizing these
opportunities while mitigating risks.
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Armed conflict in fragile states erodes health systems,
where health systems are defined as the organized net-
work of institutions, resources and people that deliver
health care to populations. Research shows destruction of
these health systems, or sectors, is a primary reason for
persistently high mortality and morbidity in conflict-
affected and fragile states (CAFS) for years after hostil-
ities cease [1]. In these absences of robust health systems,
international health initiatives also fail to achieve their
goals since programs cannot be effectively implemented
[2]. The majority of Millennium Development Goals will
go unmet in the 35 fragile countries listed by the World
Bank [3].
What can be done to protect and quickly recover
health systems in fragile and conflict-affected states?
There has been significant debate in the past decade
both about conceptualizing and how best to support
elements of health systems in CAFS. In 2004, the
World Health Organization offered a description of
health systems based on six ‘building blocks’, or in-
puts. These included governance, finance, health ser-
vices, information systems, medicines and technologies,
and workforce. For outcomes, there is loose consensus
that functioning health systems should improve the
health of the population, achieve high levels of public
satisfaction with services, and protect citizens from so-
cial and financial risk [4,5].
International efforts to support health systems in
CAFS are directed toward a variety of these building
blocks and outcomes. Initiatives have ranged from cre-
ating new health governance and performance assess-
ment strategies [6,7] to strengthening health finance
mechanisms [8], resurrecting health workforces, and
repairing and reconfiguring health delivery services [9].
However, a growing body of experience and research
notes that groups outside of the health sector signifi-
cantly shape the political, economic, and security
environment in which health sector support takes place
[10]. Health system researchers Frenk and Moon [11]
note that health sector actors, both domestic and inter-
national, often undertake health system interventions
isolated from key non-health actors. Writing with
respect to global health priorities generally, they remark,
“Global health is increasingly the product of cross-sector
interdependence—that is, the outcome of policymaking
processes across multiple sectors. However, global health
actors today are largely unequipped to ensure that health
concerns are adequately taken into account in crucial
policymaking arenas such as trade, investment, security,
the environment, migration, and education.”
These issues are particularly acute in fragile state
settings where diverse group of international health ac-
tors undertake health system interventions in volatilepolitical and economic circumstances. Health system
analysts Colombo and Pavignani, of the World Health
Organization, underline, “In the political deals between
governments, rebels, UN agencies, donors, develop-
ment banks, private companies and providers, foreign
armies, and peacekeepers, important decisions that affect
the health sector and shape the decision space of its
actors are taken…yet [health sector] policy discussion is
often kept within a narrow circle of health professionals
who may be remarkably unaware of the influence of
political, economic, legal, and administrative determi-
nants on health developments.” [10].
One particular group of non-health actors plays a
particularly significant role in fragile states: Inter-
national security forces (ISFs). ISFs deployed to fragile
states with a mandate to protect civilians and promote
stability are key actors relevant to shaping the environ-
ment in which health sector interventions take place.
Yet, to date there is limited systematic work examining
the scope of impacts of international security organiza-
tions on health sectors. Their broad mandates, vast
resources, and breadth of engagement in fragile states,
however, raise the possibility they do impact health
systems in, as of yet, undocumented ways. This consti-
tutes a problem for actors focused on the health system:
with little insight into the ways ISFs might impact health
system supporting efforts, they will remain unable to
anticipate the negative impacts ISFs might have on the
process of health system protection, recovery and recon-
struction; conversely they will remain unable to leverage
the resources and assets ISFs might lend to health system
support, or evaluate the risks inherent in utilizing these
resources.International security forces and health
Discussions about the role of ISFs in health largely focus
on the robust debates about ISFs directly providing short
term health services in order to achieve a tactical
military objective, like currying the favor of a particular
person or group of people. Concerns about these ‘quick
impact projects’ predominantly regard their subversion
of the impartiality of humanitarian health services
[12,13]. A number of important guidelines have been
developed that aim to constrain these activities and
reserve the involvement of militaries in relief efforts for
exceptional cases, including the “The Use of Foreign
Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief
(the Oslo Guidelines)” and “Civil-Military Guidelines
during Complex Emergencies” [14,15]. Likewise guide-
lines relevant to military-humanitarian relations and
forums to guide the interactions between militaries
and humanitarian organizations have also evolved. For
example, the UN Office for the Coordination of
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interactions, providing training for UN peacekeepers and
hosting round tables and conferences specific to regions
where these organizations may come into conflict with
one another [16]. The UN health cluster system creates
an information-sharing forum for the plethora of health
organizations providing humanitarian health aid during
emergencies and has issued guidelines with respect to
working with militaries to delivery humanitarian health
aid [17]. Further, various ISFs and health NGOs have
variations of ‘civil-military’ liaisons with a diversity of
aims and goals [18]. These forums and mechanisms
represent a huge step forward in clarifying roles and
relationships when addressing emergency humanitarian
health needs of people in fragile settings. However, be-
cause they are framed in terms of humanitarian health
aid delivery, their application to issues of health sector
protection, recovery and reconstruction is limited. Sev-
eral papers including the Humanitarian Policy Group
at the Overseas Development Institute, Trends and chal-
lenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination” [18]
and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Civil-
Military Relationship in Complex-Emergencies” pro-
vide in-depth reviews of these debates [19].
However, while important and related, these discus-
sions of ISFs’ role in providing short-term humanitarian
health care services and their relationship to humanitar-
ian organizations are insufficient. The size, scope, scale
and political influence of many ISFs suggests their im-
pact on health systems run deeper than just the effects
on short-term humanitarian health aid. There is an array
of ways ISFs may influence health systems overall which
need to be understood.
Second, an exclusive focus on military involvement in
humanitarian aid delivery signals that humanitarian aid
is the only health related issue relevant to the security
community in CAFS. Since ISFs can never, by definition,
be humanitarian actors on account of their lack of neu-
trality and independence from governments, their role
in humanitarian aid delivery should be limited if not
absent. As a consequence, security organizations receive
the message that there is very little need to consider
how they impact health systems beyond adhering to the
Geneva Conventions’ rules on avoidance of targeting
health infrastructure and personnel and honoring guide-
lines limiting their participation in humanitarian aid
delivery [20].
The purpose of this paper, then, is to describe the
breadth of impacts ISFs have on health systems in the
complex environment of CAFS and to explore, in in-
stances where ISFs did impact health systems, the for-
ums, mechanisms, and policies that influenced their
interactions with health system actors. To achieve this,
the paper provides a cross case comparative analysis offour cases in a diverse set of fragile state contexts to
document and analyze:
 the array of instances when ISFs impacted one or
more of the six WHO building blocks of fragile
states’ health systems
 the forums, or mechanisms by which ISFs interact
with health sector actors during this process, and
 the policies that facilitate or hinder ISF support of
health system building blocks in CAFS.
Methods
Our goal was to identify the common patterns by which
ISFs impact health sector building blocks, engage with
health sector actors, and identify policies that constrain
or facilitate their engagement so that health sector
actors can predict how ISFs may behave in future fragile
state contexts. One method by which to generate pre-
dictive findings is by using a comparative method called
the ‘most different’ approach [21] or ‘the method of
agreement’ [22]. Here the strategy is to compare cases
where all major elements differ except for the phenom-
ena in question. The power of this approach lies in
forcing researchers to confront “such a broad range of
cases that they must distill out of that diversity a set of
common elements that prove to have great explanatory
power” [23].
We chose to compare cases that differed, notably by
geography, reason for international intervention, type
and size of ISF, and timeframe of ISF involvement, so we
could see how ISFs consistently impacted health sectors,
engaged with health sector actors, and were constrained
by policies, despite these variations. We describe how
we conducted the individual cases below and follow it
with a description of the methods for the comparative
analysis.
Conducting the case studies
We conducted a series of four case studies in Haiti [24],
Kosovo [25], Afghanistan [26] and Libya [27]. The pur-
pose of these cases was to identify and describe in detail
major examples of ISF interactions with health systems
in fragile state contexts, the forums or mechanisms by
which they interacted with health system actors, and the
policies that facilitated or hindered these interactions, as
perceived by participants in the case studies.
The cases were conducted, analyzed and published
between September 2011-December 2013. Three criteria
were established for case country selection. First, all case
countries were defined as fragile situations by the World
Bank [3]. Second, in each case a human security crisis,
such as natural disaster, ethnic conflict, intra- or inter-
state conflict, or insurgency, threatened the health
system and further, there was a global crisis response
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a multinational security force with a peace keeping,
peace building, or stabilization mandate was present.
We chose the resulting cases to represent a broad
range of circumstances so findings would be applicable
to a variety of contexts.
We defined ‘international security force’ as an institu-
tion that carried an internationally sanctioned mandate
to use force to restore public order and maintain or en-
force peace. This included militaries, military coalitions,
police, intelligence agencies, peacekeeping, and peace
enforcement missions and encompassed their political
leadership bodies. It also included ‘rule of law’ missions,
such as those conducted by the European Union, where
the mission has the power to investigate, arrest, pros-
ecute and imprison citizens of a fragile state. Of note,
we did not interview indigenous security forces or non-
state armed groups. These actors undoubtedly impact
health systems, but their interactions with the health
sector and the policy prescriptions that may change their
behavior were beyond the scope of the case studies.
We chose this expansive definition of ISF for two rea-
sons, one practical and one aspirational. Practically ISF
composition in fragile settings varies across cases. For
example, in some cases foreign militaries run anti-
corruption initiatives or take on a policing role. In other
cases foreign civilian organizations play these roles [28].
We wanted our findings to apply to this wide array of
organizations involved in the security sector that may
possess different titles but fulfill similar functions.
Secondly, a large number of both health and security
organizations and the fractured arrays of lines of leader-
ship, guidance messages, mandates, goals and strategies
undermine efforts at maintaining focus on a common
goal of supporting indigenous institutions in fragile
states. In our attempt to generate findings applicable to
all international organizations involved in the security
sector, we hope to lend coherence and consistency to
the process of health system support on the part of
security actors. This speaks to our aspiration for security
organizations and their political leadership to internalize
the World Health Organization’s message that health
systems are indeed ‘everybody’s business’ [4].
For the purposes of devising an investigative plan,
we used the six World Health Organization (WHO)
building blocks of health systems as a template for
investigation, exploring how each building block was
affected by a crisis in each case. We examined three
distinct time points of the crisis including: a) immedi-
ately prior to ISF intervention, b) during intervention,
c) and, if applicable, after intervention until the present
day.
We first conducted literature reviews and background
interviews with respect to each building block of thecountry’s health system and with respect to the inter-
national security forces present. We reviewed scholarly
articles, public reports, organization documents, lecture
and newspaper articles about each country’s health system
and how crisis affected it. We also reviewed organizational
documents pertinent to guidelines governing civilian-
military interaction, mandates of security organizations
with respect to delivery of health care, protecting instru-
ments of government and civilian protection.
We identified key informants during this process
including indigenous health sector leadership, indigen-
ous civilian emergency workers, health NGO leaders,
donors engaged in health system support, military mem-
bers acting as liaisons with civilian health groups, and
leaders of UN, NATO, or and individual country’s secur-
ity mission. We also used these reviews to triangulate
information later gleaned from interviews.
Next, we conducted semi-structured interviews. Key
informants were invited to participate via email. We
obtained verbal informed consent before commencing
interviews, including an explanation that information
gleaned from interviews was not for attribution. Inter-
views were semi-structured around the themes of the
WHO building blocks and tailored to the interviewees’
background and known involvement in the health
sector. Each interview probed for instances of interac-
tions between ISFs and health system building blocks.
Other key informants were identified through the
process of “snow ball” interviewing whereby interviewees
identify others who are relevant to the subject at hand.
Those people were in turn invited to interview, with the
process continuing until the point of repetition when
only informants who had already been identified were
mentioned.
These interviews were conducted in the field in
both Haiti and Kosovo. Because of security concerns,
fieldwork was not possible in Afghanistan and Libya,
although several primary research team members had
deployed to Afghanistan multiple times. Every effort
was made to interview key informants in person when
they traveled outside of the country. When this was
not possible, interviews were conducted by phone.
During these interviews, we flagged any mention of
ISF involvement in any of the health system, and coded
them by building block. After reviewing the interview
transcripts, the research team discussed and mutually
agreed upon what the major examples of ISF engage-
ment or impact on the health system were in each case.
We then generated an investigative plan to explore
these examples, with the goal of writing a ‘narrative’
detailing the example in-depth.
The investigative plans for each narrative included
again literature reviews and key informant interviews.
Two sets of questions were the focus of each narrative
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ture of ISF involvement in the health sector: what
building block(s) did the ISF impact? In the view of
participants, was this involvement helpful, harmful,
mixed, or irrelevant? In the participants view, were
there ‘missed opportunities’ when ISFs did not deploy
capabilities that could be valuable to supporting health
systems? The second addressed interactions with health
sector actors and policies that influenced those interac-
tions: What were the forums and mechanisms by which
security actors interacted with health sector actors, if
any? Were they formal or informal? How were roles
negotiated? Did they rely on any policy guidance when
planning their interventions? How did these interven-
tions relate to the ISF’s organization mandate and in-
ternal policies? In the interviewee’s view, did these
mandates and policies help to define the ISF’s role and
did they facilitate positive ISF impacts on the health
system?
We generated case reports by first summarizing the
health system of the case country, the international
intervention in the country’s health system, and the
types and mandates of international security actors in
the case. The narratives, 2-3 per case, comprised the
second half of the case study reports.
Conducting the cross case analysis
We carried out the cross-case analysis by reading and
re-reading the four compiled case studies, eleven in-
cluded narratives, and the original case study interview
transcripts [29]. The analytic process was similar to the
individual case analysis in that data from these sources
were again grouped according to:
 How and which building blocks of the health system
did ISFs repeatedly engage or impact? In the view of
participants what was the effect of this impact on
health system outcomes?
 What forums or mechanisms did ISFs utilize to
interact with health sector actors?
 What were the policy issues that facilitated or
hindered ISF contributions to health system
protection, recovery or reconstruction?
Common themes with respect to these questions were
identified and discussed among the team. Team consen-
sus about the answers to the above questions was
achieved through repeated discussion and reviewing of
the primary data.
Results
We first summarize the four case studies and then,
drawing on examples from the cases, answer the three
primary questions of the cross case analysis.Case summaries
Haiti: The Haitian case study examined the role of ISFs,
including the US military, UN Peacekeepers, and other
bilateral foreign militaries engaged with Haiti’s health
system after the 2010 earthquake. The case contained
three narratives. The first examined the US military’s
involvement in reestablishing the health system’s medical
supply networks and health infrastructure. How this im-
pacted the authority and legitimacy of indigenous health
sector leaders was examined. The second explored the
use of bilateral militaries deployment of tertiary care
facilities. While these facilities were not aimed at health
system support, the narrative considered how such
resources could bolster indigenous health service deliv-
ery organization capacity in similar scenarios. The third
narrative discussed how cholera, introduced to Haiti
accidentally by UN peacekeeping forces, impacted the
fragile health system. We discussed how such instances
might be prevented in future operations and explored
how security organizations possessing surveillance, en-
gineering, and logistics resources, could potentially miti-
gate the impact of similar public health threats [24].
Coordination mechanisms to incorporate security or-
ganizations’ contributions relied heavily on personal rela-
tionships. Formal coordination forums did emerge but
only after the establishment of trust between individual
security and health actors. When security and health
system actors did tackle a joint problem, the lack of
interoperability in communication and logistics systems
reduced their effectiveness. Overarching policy issues
included the mandates of security organizations, which
focused on providing emergency relief but not protect-
ing and bolstering indigenous health, food and water
systems [24].
Kosovo: Kosovo’s case focused on NATO’s intervention
in Kosovo during the 1999 war through the present day,
and the civilian European Rule of Law mission, EULEX,
which strives to reduce high-level corruption in Kosovo’s
post-war government. The first narrative discussed strat-
egies for international rule of law missions to prevent
health sector corruption from taking root in similar mis-
sions. The second narrative looked at the need for robust
epidemiologic surveillance systems in fragile states and
examined how NATO’s new epidemiologic surveillance
system that detects epidemics among troops might also
feed into the World Health Organizations’ emerging dis-
ease surveillance system, EWARN. The third narrative
told the story of NATO’s response to its discovery of lead
contamination in Northern Kosovo. The health, eco-
nomic, and political opportunities and challenges in-
volved in NATO detecting this public health threat were
explored [25].
Coordination strategies between health and security
actors remain largely ad hoc and underutilized according
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open to engaging the security community in health sys-
tem support issues, it was unclear who to speak with or
how to work with these organizations. Policy issues
again included the mandates and scope of work of secur-
ity organizations as well as the low political value placed
on health system improvement and reform [25].
Afghanistan: The Afghanistan case examined the role
of the US military, NATO forces, and the UN peacekeep-
ing mission in Afghanistan’s newly minted health sector.
One narrative explored the scale and scope of NATO’s
program to create a health system for Afghanistan’s mili-
tary and security personnel and discussed how this
effort impacted the health system overall. Foreign mili-
taries impact on the Afghan Ministry of Health’s
participation in the Global Polio Eradication Campaign
served as the focus of the second narrative. The narra-
tive detailed how NATO coalition forces arrived at a
‘passive support’ strategy of the polio campaign in an
effort to lessen their political impact on the Ministry of
Health. The third and final narrative examined ISFs’
negative impacts on health delivery and governance
through health-related counterinsurgency projects. It
examined the tensions between, as well as the oppor-
tunities to reconcile the goals of counterinsurgency and
health system strengthening [26].
A plethora of coordinating bodies and mechanisms
arose over the past decade of conflict in Afghanistan.
Interestingly, most of them took years to materialize.
The issues covered in the narratives were rarely in-
formed by early coordination with health sector actors.
Those that were utilized were often stymied by high staff
turnover on the part of security and health organization
personnel. The policy issues that loomed large in
Afghanistan where ISFs’ use of highly controversial
health ‘hearts and minds’ operations sowed distrust and
anger on the part of health sector actors who saw this
strategy as undermining the impartiality of indigenous
health care institutions and turning seeking of health care
services into a political act on the part of civilians [26].
Libya: The Libya Case focused on NATO’s civilian
protection mission in Libya in 2012. Two issues were
explored in the case body and through two narratives.
The first was NATO and OCHA’s use of new strat-
egies for protecting health system infrastructure and
workforce. The narrative investigated how ISFs can
best gain awareness of health system threats and com-
municate with health system actors using these new
approaches. The second narrative focused on Libya’s
program to care for its war wounded by sending them
abroad for care. The program, riddled with fraud,
drained the Ministry of Health budget and weakened
the new government of Libya. The narrative noted how
ISFs can potentially play a helpful role in supportingessential care for the war wounded in fragile states and
thus improve the capacity and functioning of indigenous
health service organizations [27].
Coordination issues were the focus of the first narra-
tive regarding how new forums and information plat-
forms could be utilized to improve situational awareness
of the health sector. Policy issues included NATO’s lack
of mandate to participate in institution recovery or
rebuilding after the cessation of hostilities, even though
they may have improved health sector reconstruction in
retrospect [27].What health system building blocks were impacted by
ISFs in the cases?
ISF impacts’ on the cases’ health systems fall into three
‘building block’ groups: health sector governance, health
information systems and indigenous health services.Health sector governance
ISFs impacted health system governance in two respects.
First ISFs created parallel health systems or sub-systems
that circumscribed the resources and power of the state’s
health system leadership. Second, they performed regu-
latory functions for health systems.
Foreign militaries established parallel health systems
or sub-systems in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Haiti. This
process was most extensive in Afghanistan, where donor
government militaries invested heavily in a completely
separate health system for Afghanistan’s military and
police [26]. The impetus was in response to the attrition
rate of the Afghan forces from illness which was more
than 18 times than from battlefield injury [30]; thus
efforts to build an Afghan security force hinged on
improving the health of personnel. In response, ISFs cre-
ated dozens of health facilities and developed medical
training programs with the goal of providing healthcare
to over 1 million beneficiaries. As a result, different gov-
ernment departments—the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Defense—housed the civilian and military
health systems, both competing for donor funds and
health workers [26]. Likewise, in Kosovo and Haiti,
foreign militaries financed the health systems’ disaster and
public health emergency response capabilities [25,31,32].
These programs also lived outside the Ministries of
Health, and according to case study participants, required
the health ministries to have to negotiate with other
government officials to leverage necessary resources to re-
spond to public health threats. In Haiti in particular, the
practice of housing assets outside the Ministry of Health’s
control rendered it unable to respond to public health
emergencies [33]. Moreover, since security organizations
harbored considerable logistics capabilities—transport,
communications, and security—sometimes health officials
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assets necessary to manage a public health crisis [24].
In the cases, ISFs also were involved in regulatory
functions of the health system. At times, they enforced
the laws of the health system and/or bolstered the
authority and accountability of its leadership. Notably,
ISFs fielded anti-corruption campaigns in both Kosovo
and Afghanistan [25,26]. These initiatives addressed in-
stances of widespread health system procurement fraud
and involved the arrest of high-level ministry officials
[30,34]. In Afghanistan, Haiti and Kosovo, ISFs bolstered
and extended the authority of health leadership. For
example, in Haiti, health officials requested US military
personnel to confront foreign aid workers not following
the ministry’s policies [24]. In Afghanistan, when coali-
tion forces initially provided health care to civilians, evi-
dence mounted that this undermined the competence
and capability of the Ministry of Health in the eyes of
some populations, who perceived their own government
to be unable to delivery essential services. Because of
these findings, coalition forces developed alternative pro-
grams to implement the Ministry of Health’s national
health agenda in remote and insecure districts with the
hope it reversed these unintended consequences [35]. In
Kosovo, health officials worked to gain the backing of
ISF leadership so as to advance the Ministry’s health
reform laws. One Kosovar ministry official explained
that security forces carried enough authority to be able
to put health issues on the government’s agenda. “If only
one representative from NATO would come with me to
our intergovernmental meetings to put [health reform]
on the national agenda that would be enough to make
progress [in advancing the health reform law]” [25].
Health information systems
The WHO guide “Analyzing Disrupted Health Sectors”
notes, “the strongest indicator of crisis is lack of data”
[10]. This truth is evident throughout each of the four
cases. Baseline assessments of health system perform-
ance prior to the crisis were absent or inaccessible to
both health system leadership and international crisis
responders. Even information like the location of basic
health infrastructure was absent in some instances [36].
Situational awareness, or continuous assessment moni-
toring during a crisis period, was limited because of lack
of collective forums to report, find or collate real-time
information. Post-crisis health threat surveillance systems
did not link to appropriate action plans for detected
threats, leading to diffusion of responsibility across
response organizations and fragile state governments.
For example in one instance in Kosovo, NATO forces
alerted UN authorities in 2000 to lead contamination in
the Mitrovica region, particularly affecting residents of
an internally displaced persons camp in the area. Becauseit was unclear whose responsibility it was to act on such
information, it was not until 2005—five years later—that
international organizations undertook efforts to relocate
camp residents [25].
These health information problems hindered security
organizations’ assistance to health sectors. In Haiti, lack
of basic information about the health sector, such as
maps of the country or where clinics and hospitals were
located, meant military earthquake responders initially
did not know where to send medical resources [24].
Likewise, in Kosovo the chaos of the post-conflict period
apparently obscured looting of medical institutions and
targeting of health workers until too late for policy
makers to direct security forces to protect them [37].
We found examples throughout the cases of when
security organizations both contributed to or missed the
opportunity to contribute to health information short-
falls or uptake health sector information when it was
available. In Haiti, militaries contributed valuable drone
and satellite imagery of the earthquake-affected area that
civilian volunteers then used in their remarkable effort
to generate detailed maps used by all crisis responders,
including militaries [38]. In Kosovo, NATO developed
a sophisticated epidemiologic surveillance system that
could rapidly detect outbreaks of communicable dis-
eases. This surveillance tool currently is focused exclu-
sively on detecting disease outbreaks among deployed
soldiers. If policy barriers regarding sharing of infor-
mation between security and health actors could be
overcome, this epidemiologic surveillance system could
be leveraged to detect public health threats to the ci-
vilian population as well [25]. In Libya, OCHA worked
with volunteer ‘crisis mappers’ to document population
movements and the functional status of health facil-
ities. However, although this information may have
been useful to militaries in avoiding harm to people
and facilities, they were reluctant to use it because it
came from novel and internally unverified sources and
methods [27].
In Haiti, the UN mission established a sophisticated
information gathering operation to detect early signs of
civil unrest, monitor crime, and political instability. Pub-
lic health threats and epidemics, which do inflame local
tensions and can stoke civil unrest, were not included in
this surveillance operation. However, monitoring critical
health data through these operations could help sensitize
UN Heads of Mission to the political and societal
impacts of public health emergencies, enabling them to
better allocate resources to addressing them [24].
Indigenous health service delivery
Indigenous health delivery service organizations—those
run or managed through the country’s health sector—
were heavily damaged or completely destroyed in every
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influence on humanitarian health aid delivered by hu-
manitarian NGOs and ISF influence on indigenous
health care organizations native to the country’s health
sector. In some cases the lines between these two were
blurred as when a particular foreign NGO had been
present in a state for so long it might be viewed as
native to the health sector. Further, concerns about an
ISF’s impact on the impartiality of the health sector
paralleled similar concerns about ISFs and their impact
on humanitarian neutrality, impartiality and independ-
ence. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this project we
maintained this distinction for conceptual clarity.
Case analysis showed that security organizations had
significant impacts on indigenous health care services in
four ways.
First, because they are armed, security organizations
possess the capability to directly protect or destroy
health system service programs and their necessary
assets, like buildings and supplies. In Libya, there was
an explicit effort by NATO to identify and protect
health service organizations and programs. As a result,
NATO managed to avoid causing direct damage to indi-
genous health organization infrastructure [27]. In Haiti,
militaries guarded health care organization infrastructure
and helped reestablish medical distribution points for
indigenous health care organizations [39]. In Kosovo,
however, NATO and UN peacekeepers were unable to
protect Serbian health workers. Seeking refuge in pro-
tected enclaves, the vast majority left the Kosovar health
system. This contributed to the creation of a parallel
health system for Serbian citizens, which persists to this
day. Later, however, NATO forces became instrumental
in protecting patients and medical supply routes in this
parallel system [37,40]. While we did not explicitly inves-
tigate nor uncover instances of security forces directly
targeting health system assets, the International Red
Cross/Red Crescent Society report on Health Care in
Danger does document dozens of instances when they
have: security forces can pose a direct threat [41].
Of note, protection of health service programs may
require intentional distance from security actors. In
Afghanistan, the visible proximity of NATO troops to
the Afghan Ministry of Health’s participation in the Glo-
bal Polio Eradication Campaign (GPEC) was a significant
problem. The population assumed GPEC was a formal
military run health program and it became a target for
Taliban-aligned forces [26]. After extensive negotiations
with the Ministry of Health, NATO adopted a “passive
support” policy whereby NATO forces would remain as
far away as possible from the campaign while engaged in
ceasing hostilities nearby [42].
Second, in every case, militaries and security groups
provided direct medical care to civilians. Empoweredby the medical resources necessary to care for their
personnel, militaries possessed high value medical as-
sets. These resources were allocated to civilians as well
but their relative impact on indigenous health service
delivery varied widely across each country. In one im-
portant example in Afghanistan, NATO medical forces
used medical projects to generate good will toward the
coalition forces and to collect human intelligence [43].
This practice had many negative impacts. It was widely
condemned by Afghan officials and international aid
workers alike and compromised the impartiality of health-
care [44]. It also undermined the authority of the Afghan
Ministry of Public Health by signaling to civilians that
health care provision was the domain of foreign militaries
and not of their own government. An internal investiga-
tion by NATO confirmed the approach’s inefficacy and
divisiveness, and coalition forces eventually transformed
their medical programs to be owned and run by the
Afghan Ministry of Public Health [43].
In Haiti and Libya the role of direct care delivery on
the part of militaries could have bolstered the capacities
of indigenous health service organizations according to
case study participants. Twenty-six militaries provided
health care in Haiti, with three—the US, Canadian, and
Israeli—providing tertiary care services [24,45]. The US
and Canadian militaries also provided helicopter patient
transport services. Although no quantitative data was
available from the case to confirm, health providers
argued these services increased indigenous health orga-
nizations’ capacity by unburdening them of the sickest,
most resource intensive patients [46]. Similarly in Libya,
the newly minted Ministry of Health for political
reasons was forced to continue a three billion dollar,
corrupt, and unsustainable program to send citizens
wounded in the war to other countries for care.
Ministry officials postulated they would have had a
much stronger political negotiating position to end the
program had ISFs offered short-term trauma care for
war wounded as an alternative [27].
Third, security organizations’ logistics capabilities were
leveraged to assist indigenous health service organizations
resume provision of health services. The US military in
Haiti provided the most significant example of this;
they fielded 10,000 soldiers who reopened supply
routes into the country. These forces were able to
open the single strip airport in Port au Prince within
hours of the earthquake and cleared rubble from and
organized the medical warehouse that served as the
main distribution point for medications [47].
Finally and fourth, security organizations directly
impacted the population’s burden of disease and the sub-
sequent burden on the sectors’ health service programs.
The most significant example again was in Haiti, where
security actors inadvertently contaminated the country’s
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killing thousands, sickening hundreds of thousands and
remains now endemic in the country [48].
Forums and mechanisms for ISF-health system actor
interaction
Purposeful planning to support health systems was
the exception rather than the rule in the four cases.
Few, if any, standing formal institutional coordination
mechanisms existed between security organizations and
international or state health agencies. Rather, coordin-
ation mechanisms and policies had to be negotiated in
the middle of crises and often in reaction to complaints
in each instance. As mentioned in Afghanistan, pro-
longed negotiations with Ministry of Health officials
finally led coalition forces to reform their policies for
direct care provision and support for the Global Polio
eradication campaign [26]. In Haiti mounting public
complaints from health NGOs compelled the US military
forces and US State Department to respond and invent a
structured system for prioritization of medical and relief
supplies in the supply chains they were tasked with
reconstituting and managing [49].
Helpful support from security organizations was fa-
cilitated by personal relationships between security and
health system actors. Both mundane tasks such as
negotiating patient transport mechanisms and large-
scale responses such as polio eradication procedures
and protection of health service supply chains in Libya
hinged on individual relationships and the good will
they engendered. However, high staff turnover–endemic
to both security and health responders–threatened those
working procedures. As one participant in the Haiti
case study noted, “Turnover with NGOs is a huge
problem…it causes a psychic shutdown. They think
you are not cooperating but you’re shut down because
you are having to start over yet again.” Global polio
eradication workers in Afghanistan also noted this
difficulty. “Frequent turnover among military staff can
make it harder for the humanitarian community to
establish strong working relationships and coordination
mechanisms, but the often cited hurdle can be over-
come if both parties are determined to make such
relationships work” [26].
The creation of “problem solving spaces” was also
important. Forums were needed where security and
health system actors could meet, exchange information
and ideas, provide feedback and address problems in
an open and collaborative way. In Haiti, the Joint
Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC) successfully
created a mechanism to allocate security force re-
sources to helping health service organizations. This
mechanism afforded crisis response leadership an op-
portunity to organize and prioritize military assistanceto health service groups [24]. The most successful
example may be NATO’s “docking station” concept in-
stituted during the Libya campaign, run by Joint Task
Force Unified Protector in its operational command
center. This task force established an office to serve as
a clear point of contact with NGOs providing relief.
The office went beyond public relations by providing a
repository and response command for outside groups’
concerns. Critically, the office leadership was able to
inform and influence NATO’s operational planning
process based on the information it received from out-
side groups. It also had the authority to provide valuable
information to these groups in return [50]. According to
case study participants, this space to collate information
and address shared concerns was influential in minimiz-
ing harm to indigenous health organizations in Libya
[27]. Of note, the World Health Organization’s Health
Cluster, which focused on humanitarian health action,
rarely provided a productive forum for security actors to
interact with health sector actors in our cases. The rea-
sons for this were multiple including the fact that the
Health Cluster is dedicated, by design, to humanitarian
health action rather than indigenous health system
protection. Discussions regarding how indigenous health
organizations can regain functional status or how the
sector will be financed were rare in health cluster
meetings. Also, because humanitarian health guidelines
stipulate minimal involvement of security actors in hu-
manitarian health aid, the reception of security actors
in the cluster meetings was mixed and many partici-
pants we spoke with felt it was inappropriate.
Overarching policy issues to ISFs supporting health
systems
Each case illustrated the presence of overarching policy
barriers that confronted security organizations’ ability to
best protect health systems. There were three core policy
barriers:
Lack of mandate
Security organizations’ mandates were most often fo-
cused on securing peace and targeted towards a specific
group or source of conflict. The mandate to support
health system actors and protect health system assets
was often lacking or submerged implicitly in their scope
of activities. Missing, in part, was the acknowledgement
that functioning health systems can contribute to secur-
ity and civilian protection.
Even when mandates were broad enough to include
health system support and security organizations’ actions
had a direct impact on the health system, in practice se-
curity organizations often did not view this within their
organization’s role. For example, in Kosovo, lax budget-
ing and auditing procedures established and maintained
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weak procedures facilitated corruption in the health sys-
tem. A Rule of Law mission was eventually fielded by
the European Union but it had limited powers. Unable
to help develop functioning, accountable systems, the
mission was only able to take a reactionary role, char-
ging Ministry of Health leadership with procurement
fraud [25].
In Haiti, militaries providing tertiary care to civilians
operated to provide short-term relief only. They were not
mandated or empowered to support indigenous health
system organizations, which would have not only pro-
vided services, but both restored and expanded capacity.
Tertiary care services were withdrawn before indigenous
care organizations had regained pre-earthquake function-
ing [24]. Militaries and peacekeepers in Haiti possessed
assets that could have, if called upon in a timely way,
blunted the cholera outbreak, including engineering cap-
abilities, supply chain logistics, and surveillance tools.
However political leadership seemed to view responding
to public health emergencies—even ones with ramifica-
tions on the political stability of the country—outside of
security forces’ mandates. Resources deployed were thus
not exploited to fully strengthen the weakened health
system [24,45].Lack of trust
Perceived differences in operations and missions nur-
tured distrust between ISFs and agencies supporting the
health system. In fragile states, security organizations are
not neutral; this is true even with a mandate to protect
civilians and restore stability. Additionally, provision of
health care is also not impartial; who gets access to
health resources and when can favor one political or eth-
nic group over another. Health leaders responsible for
overseeing the health system may also be aligned with
one political group or another. Despite these complex-
ities, non-governmental and many bilateral health agen-
cies supporting the health system still strive to avoid
exacerbating inequalities or supporting a single identifi-
able group. Working in collaboration with security groups
or being seen to “cooperate” with them can politicize
health care provision and may stoke conflict rather than
lessen it. This conflict complicates aid agencies’ and other
health focused organizations’ willingness to develop rela-
tionships and collaborations with security forces and
organizations.
The cases demonstrate this tension, particularly in
Afghanistan where militaries undertook direct health de-
livery activities in order to achieve numerous objectives
that had very little to do with promoting civilian health
or improving health system functioning. While initially
perceived as an essential strategy by the InternationalSecurity Forces Afghanistan, the practice was controver-
sial and polarizing. It was later scrapped for its unantici-
pated harm to local and alliance relations and its paucity
of useful data [43].
Security organizations also were hesitant to trust
health stakeholders, as evidenced by their reluctance to
share public health information. While there was tension
around classified or possibly sensitive information, the
practice of withholding or classifying information was
also acknowledged to be largely reflexive. Security or-
ganization members were used to automatically protect-
ing information. “Even when we were given an order to
share information, we found it difficult because our sys-
tems are not set up to share”, one case participant
acknowledged.
A second source of distrust understandably arose
from the chaos of many agencies and actors working
as part of the crisis response in the health system
space. Health systems in the cases, like in many fragile
and conflict-affected states, were flooded with a variety
of actors and agencies jockeying for influence. The
lack of a clear, leading, international agency respon-
sible for organizing the efforts and for liaising with the
Ministry of Health perpetuated poor communication,
duplication of work, and gaps in health services. Se-
curity actors because of their prominent role in crisis
response were often barraged by a wide array of NGO
workers, politicians, and agency representatives request-
ing partnership or a strategy change. Yet, who to trust,
with whom to share information or from whom to solicit
opinion was not clear.Lack of institutional interoperability
In all four cases, security organizations’ involvement in
the health system was ad hoc and subsequently, institu-
tional interoperability with health groups was lacking. A
stark example was in Haiti when the US military was
tasked with reopening the airport and reconstituting
supply routes throughout the country. The technical and
logistics capability displayed by the US military was
impressive. Yet, the lack of communications procedures,
policies around sharing information, and prioritizing
supplies blunted their effectiveness. Health workers, for
example, struggled to find medications because the crush
of supplies, often unlabeled, coming through fragile supply
lines managed by the US military took weeks to organize
and distribute. This contributed to a spike in mortality
two weeks after the earthquake because wounded civilians
were unable to access adequate medical resources [33].
However difficult the logistics were, the underlying dif-
ficulty was that forums for stakeholders to collaborate
and improve distribution effectiveness in a timely way
simply did not exist until weeks after the earthquake
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fact that ISFs were involved in health system logistics to
some extent, as in Haiti, interoperability in terms of
common understanding, joint problem solving space,
communication platforms, and patient tracking mecha-
nisms, didn’t exist.Discussion
This analysis shows that ISF involvement in health go
beyond interactions with humanitarian health service
providers in fragile states. Health sector governance, in-
digenous health services, and health information systems
were the three health system ‘building blocks’ docu-
mented frequently in the cases.
In some instances ISF engagement was critical to
health system preservation, as when military forces
reconstituted medical supply chains in Haiti. In others,
their impact was dangerous and destructive, as in the
delegitimizing of the Ministry of Health in Afghanistan
during counterinsurgency operations, or with the unin-
tended introduction of, and slow response to, the chol-
era epidemic in Haiti. Moreover, the cases uncovered
multiple opportunities wherein ISFs could significantly
improve aspects of health sector preservation and func-
tioning. The potential to better protect health workers in
Kosovo and care for war-wounded in Libya, or leverage
their epidemiologic and surveillance systems to detect
and respond to public health threats in Kosovo, stand as
prime examples.
Since ISF health sector engagement can present un-
precedented opportunities for health system protection
and recovery, as well as pose dangers and risks, it should
follow that there exist mechanisms by which health sec-
tor actors can work with ISFs to carefully manage their
engagement.
Yet, to date this is not the case. Rather, interactions
between security and health sector actors are best char-
acterized as ad hoc, frequently disjointed efforts that
evolve and congeal long after opportunities to protect
health sectors and avoid unintended consequences has
passed. The case studies suggest several parameters for
the types of communication and consultative mecha-
nisms necessary to manage ISF involvement in support-
ing health sectors in CAFS. Namely, these mechanisms
need to be able to address a wide array of problems, be
nimble enough to accommodate rapidly changing cir-
cumstances, leverage the power of personal relation-
ships, and be able to address the tensions that can arise
between security and health system supporting strategies.
With these parameters in mind, we suggest two ap-
proaches to improving ISF-health sector interactions:
building expertise within ISFs with respect to health sys-
tem protection and recovery, and developing a networkof high level liaisons across security and heath sector
supporting organizations involved in fragile states.
Health security teams
Knowledge of health systems within ISFs is necessary to
avoid unintended negative impacts on health systems
and to be able to recognize and exploit opportunities to
use ISF assets to support health systems. Some security
policymakers may feel uncomfortable developing this
expertise within ISFs because it seems so far afield from
traditional security training. Indeed, few security organi-
zations appear to invest in programs or foster career
paths devoted to developing experts in public health
emergency response much less health system strength-
ening. However, at least within militaries, there is long
precedence of public health and medical advising. This
experience has, until recently, focused primarily on keep-
ing troops healthy and addressing public health threats to
personnel, rather than the public health toll of conflict
on civilians. The rubrics of ‘stability’, ‘peace building’ and
‘civilian protection’ missions have the potential to change
this focus because these concepts emphasize supporting
effective indigenous governing institutions to varying
degrees [51,52]. ISFs could thus build health system sup-
port into their long-established health training programs
with the reassurance that this would be in line with
increasing their capacity to conduct these ‘non-trad-
itional’ types of security missions.
While deployment of this expertise could take many
forms, we recommend ‘Health Security Teams’ that
would be deployed on the ground. These teams would
differ from traditional civilian-military or NGO liaisons
because they would have as a primary goal health system
support and would have specific training in public health
and institution building in fragile states. Further, there
would be clarity that their jobs are not to overshadow
health sector actors or supplant health sector support
with military objectives but rather to manage the secur-
ity organizations role in health system support initia-
tives. Health-Security Teams’ work would be two-fold.
The first would be to address and optimize the myriad
aspects of health system building blocks impacted by
ISFs in a particular fragile setting. The cases offer a blue-
print, or ‘building-block’ based checklist of issues for
health–security teams to consider. Regarding supporting
health sector governance, for example, health-security
teams might approach health system leaders to plan how
separate health systems for security personnel or invest-
ments in the emergency and disaster preparedness sys-
tems can dovetail with Ministry of Health initiatives and
avoid competition between different fragile state minis-
tries for health workers, public health emergency assets,
or donor funding. Health security teams part of ISF Rule
of Law missions might seek out opportunities to build
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health system performance information systems so as to
improve transparency and stave off corruption. In pe-
riods of acute crisis, health security teams could gener-
ate proposals for how the ISF could stem the loss of
health sector instruments of governance like health
records and epidemiologic surveillance systems. The full
checklist of potential issues for health-security teams to
consider, broken down by building block, is included in
Table 1. Table 1 is organized by three levels of crisis acu-
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The potential health supporting activities listed in Table 1 are broken down by the
international security forces (ISFs). It is also organized by acuity of crises facing the
minimal or insidious. Opportunities for strengthening health system functions exist
of health system functions are possible. Protection of assets and mitigating loss of
health system assets and functions are made, or significant reforms to health system
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delivering health aid or on humanitarian space generally. The Interagency Standing
assessing the risks to humanitarian principles presented by ISF involvement in hum
decide to provide health care directly to populations, both an analysis of how this w
how it will impact humanitarian space needs to be undertaken.threats to the health system are minimal or insidious.
Opportunities for strengthening health system functions
exist. During acute crises, significant losses of health
sector assets and degradation of health system functions
are possible. Protection of assets and mitigating loss of
health system functions is the priority. In post-crisis
periods, efforts to restore health system assets and func-
tions are made, or significant reforms to health system
building blocks are undertaken.
The second function of Health Security Teams would
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health sector building blocks the cases revealed were most often affected by
health sector. In ‘periods of quiescence’ threats to the health system are
. During acute crises, significant losses of health sector assets and degradation
health system functions is the priority. In post-crisis periods, efforts to restore
building blocks are undertaken.
ting health sectors in fragile settings and participating in humanitarian health
reful analysis of how ISF actions will impact humanitarian organizations
Committee and Global Health Cluster guidelines provide an excellent tool for
anitarian health operations, for example [20]. In some instances, as when ISFs
ill impact the indigenous health sector mentioned above, and an analysis of
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demonstrate, the goals of ISFs as well as civilians’ per-
ception of ISF involvement can vary widely, depending
of the context, and change overtime. In Afghanistan
overt and visible signs of ISF engagement in health
elevated distrust of the population and did appear to
politicize the health sector. In Kosovo, the opposite was
true at least in the context of 2012 when health sector
leaders solicited coalition force involvement in health
sector issues because of their perceived fair mindedness.
OCHA describes different types of interactions between
humanitarian and military actors in conflict zones, ran-
ging from minimal interaction to collaboration [17]. A
similar range of interactions may be necessary between
ISF members and health sector actors. Judgments about
how and when to adopt different types of inter-
organization relationships can only be made by those
familiar with the context, stakeholders, and issues over
time. ISFs need to come to the field prepared to make
these judgments with counterparts in health system sup-
porting organizations.
Policy networks
Developing field level expertise alone within ISFs is
insufficient; they alone would be unable to address the
overarching policy concerns that cut across multiple
fragile state contexts.
To meet this additional requirement, we recommend
development of a network of liaisons across major health
sector and security organizations. The past two decades
have seen the emergence of networks of practitioners to
tackle a range of thorny foreign policy problems includ-
ing cross-border law enforcement, economic trade issues
and environmental policy problems [53]. Networks of
liaisons, across humanitarian and UN agencies, such as
the Interagency Standing Committee have been par-
ticularly influential in generating policies that impact
military-humanitarian relationships.
While both security and health sector organizations
presently field a diverse group of liaisons on occasion,
the network we propose would be more formalized and
participants would share several unique features. They
would be knowledgeable about their own organization,
yet share a common training in supporting institutions,
particularly health, in fragile states. Importantly, they
would wield enough leverage in their own organizations
to influence its operations. They would have significant
field experience and ongoing contact with field level
health sector expertise. They would participate in for-
ums designed to foster the growth of working personal
relationships and mutual understanding.
Members of this network of practitioners would ideally
hail from health sector supporting organizations such as
the World Bank, health sector donor agencies and theirimplementing partners, the Global Fund for AIDS, Tu-
berculosis and Malaria, the Global Alliance for Vaccines
and the World Health Organization, in conjunction with
major ISFs including NATO, the African Union, the
European Union, and major bilateral militaries often
engaged in fragile states through peacekeeping missions.
The network could address at least three key policy
issues: how issues of information sharing between secur-
ity and health sector actors will be managed in fragile
settings; best practices with respect to bridging civilian
health sectors, indigenous civilian emergency response
systems and indigenous security forces’ health services;
and how security organization mandates can best
incorporate health system protection.
Issues of information sharing include deciding how
data about public health threats will be collected, shared
and acted upon across health system and security actors;
when health information will be classified and released,
and to whom it will be shared; and what assurances
security organizations can offer that health information
will not be used inappropriately.
The network of liaisons could create joint guidance
as to how to best reconcile parallel health systems. In
several of the cases security organizations funded and
built health systems for indigenous security forces or
civilian emergency response systems that sat outside
of the Ministry of Health. These health ‘subsystems’
sometimes created problems in terms of health sector
funding and human resource shortages. Better coordin-
ation among the sub-systems is needed for long term
sustainability of the health resources and personnel.
With respect to mandates, this network could advise
policy makers on how to incorporate health system
protection into security organization mandates. This
mandate should not indicate that security organiza-
tions be in charge of health systems, but rather that
they should view protecting and supporting health
systems as essential part of the overall objective of
achieving security in the long term.
During conflict or crisis, security members of this
network would already have working relationships with
key health sector support organizations that could
facilitate rapid problem solving. Using NATO’s Libya
response as a model, these security network members
could open and run “docking stations” whereby health
sector actors and even non-network members could
quickly engage the security organization to exchange
information and address emerging problems. Further
these security network members could draw on the
expertise and information of the health-security teams
to help design operations to minimize harm to health
sectors and realize opportunities to salvage threatened
health sector assets like health workers, infrastructure
and information systems.
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help manage the tensions that inevitably arise between
security strategies and health sector strengthening efforts.
There are skeptics within the global health community
wary of security organizations because of the fear that
their involvement will lead to subjugation of health to
military objectives. The use of health projects in counter-
insurgency campaigns has crystalized this skepticism. It
is instructive to note, however, that these campaigns
came about in the absence of established consultation
and communication forums between health and security
actors, not because of them. In the absence of standing
forums, it took non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and security analysts in Afghanistan ten years of protest
and confrontation to convince coalition forces to draft
and adopt doctrines that discouraged the use of direct
health provision projects as counterinsurgency tools, for
example.
The Afghanistan experience strongly suggests that
health sectors supporters need a voice within ISFs to
define and advocate for health-friendly ISF strategies.
This is not to say health system support and security
strategies will never be in conflict, or that health sec-
tor support will or should always win out when they
do conflict. As the Overseas Development Institute’s
report, “State building for peace” points out, there is
often tension between efforts to build equitable and high
functioning institutions in fragile states (state building)
and brokering the compromises among warring fac-
tions and foreign interests contesting control over state
institutions (peace building) [54]. Those interested in
building health institutions may often be in tension
with those attempting to improve security and foster
peace. Yet, these tensions make it all the more import-
ant that there are consultative forums and open lines of
communication among professionals if these tensions
are to be managed transparently, conscientiously, in a
timely way and to the benefit of all involved.
Limitations
This study possesses several inherent limitations. With
respect to the cases, data and conclusions were drawn
from impressions, memories and opinions of individuals
from four qualitative case studies conducted year(s) after
an event, perhaps reporting partial or inaccurate recol-
lections of events.
A further limitation derived from the make up of the
investigation team. On one hand having a combined
team of civilian academics and military analysts facili-
tated outreach to a wide variety of stakeholders and key
informants. We did not receive any overt refusals to par-
ticipate. On the other hand, the sensitivities some
participants may have had about speaking with NATO-
affiliated analysts or Harvard researchers may have madethem more or less reluctant to offer criticism or share
concerns. Further, not all interviews were conducted in
person in the field. Subtle but important information
gleaned from face to face interviews and field visits may
have been lost. Finally, this was a qualitative project and
subject to the tacit subjectivity of the research team.
With respect to the cross case analysis, all comparative
methodological approaches used to study social phe-
nomena must be considered with caution. The presence
of phenomena across cases may be spurious, rather than
due to the reasons proposed by the analyst and the def-
inition of the phenomena itself may be questionable
since societal or organizational behaviors are open to the
interpretation of the framers of the research. With
respect to this study, the findings are necessarily broad
since the outcome variable of interest—the health sector
building blocks—are themselves general, and sometimes
overlapping themes, rather than discrete and well de-
fined variables. The findings, grouped in terms of these
broad themes, need to be unpacked through future
narrow investigations. Our hope is that this study will
provide the rational, evidence-based foundation to that
will allow future researchers to formulate this focused
research.
Conclusions
Our case studies illustrated the complex context and
challenges to health systems in crisis-affected fragile
states. In most cases, these challenges pre-existed the
crisis and will last for years afterwards, contributing to
persistently weak health systems and subsequent high
morbidity and mortality. The cases demonstrated both
opportunities and risks in international security organi-
zations responding to help protect health systems and
support their recovery and reconstruction. Governance,
health information systems and health services are the
most accessible points of impact and there is opportun-
ity pre-, during, and post- crisis to better engage ISFs all
three areas.
This cross-case analysis and included recommenda-
tions are intended to provide a platform and a start of a
continuing discussion of security organizations’ role and
responsibilities. For example, the recommendation of es-
tablishing a permanent network of liaisons across major
health sector and security organizations will require
time, coordination and agreed commitment on the part
participants that health system preservation and support
in CAFS in desirable and possible. Open forums of dis-
cussion and consultation will be essential but will also
require joint commitment and broad representation to
be effective and worthwhile. This study is intended to
trigger the needed analysis and discussions to facilitate
supportive mandates and policies among both ISFs and
other health stakeholders in these settings.
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